Scraps Stuffs - Random musings from apun ka desh

A brilliant article from Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan who was a chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board details the issues facing Indo-US nuclear co-operation. This is reproduced below because I couldn't find a link to this excellent article from the Asian Age.

Dr A. Gopalakrishnan says that neither does the U.S. possess crucial nuclear safety experience of direct relevance to India, nor does India need its assistance

Civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the US is said to be one of the topics for discussion when our Prime Minister visits Washington in mid-July. The officials of the ministry of external affairs (MEA) are quite upbeat about this, the department of atomic energy (DAE) maintains a stoic silence on the matter, and the media analysts in the country anticipate a more optimistic outcome than everyone else. But, no official in India or the US is willing to provide a clear picture on what exactly is being discussed.

In this regard, the central questions we need to ask are these: What concrete assistance does India need from the US to further our civilian nuclear programme? In relevant areas, are the foreign policy stances of the two countries close enough to warrant the successful initiation of any meaningful nuclear cooperation, without India having to make unacceptable compromises? What is it that the US wants in return from us for this cooperation? And, what are the short-term and long-term strategic implications of such cooperation?

India today has 14 operating nuclear power reactors and nine more are under various stages of construction or commissioning. A detailed examination reveals that the US has no current experience in any of the types of nuclear reactors India is presently operating or constructing. Therefore, the DAE certainly realises that the US has no worthwhile knowledge in the design, construction, operation, maintenance or safety of any of the present or future installations of the Indian nuclear power programme.

The US and MEA officials keep hinting that the US is willing to cooperate with us in nuclear safety, but the DAE which has the primary responsibility for safety, has never asked for any such help. In fact, without any foreign technical assistance, the DAE engineers have rectified almost all the safety deficiencies which I had documented and submitted to the government as chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) in 1995. Therefore, invoking the need for safety assistance from the US is merely a ploy to indirectly plant doubts in the minds of the Indian public that DAE’s capability to maintain safety in our reactors is inadequate in comparison to US expertise. With my experience and awareness of nuclear safety in the US and India, I am convinced that neither the US possesses any crucial safety experience of direct relevance to India nor does India badly need its assistance.

The glaring indictment against the advisability of importing nuclear reactors from the US is the predicament in which we find ourselves today in the case of Tarapur reactors. The US having reneged its contractual obligation to supply lifetime fuel to these reactors, India finds itself going from country to country to get enriched uranium to keep these reactors running. Contrary to past DAE expectations, there is also no chance of attracting any foreign investment in conjunction with reactor imports.

Dr Homi Bhabha had energy security and self-reliance in mind when he framed the three-stage nuclear power plan for the country, which envisaged the use of our natural uranium and the abundant thorium resources we have, to establish a totally indigenous nuclear technology base. Today, some 50 years after Bhabha unveiled his plan, his vision rooted in self-reliance still remains the best approach for India in this increasingly unipolar world.

To meet the nuclear power targets, India needs to build a sufficient number of natural uranium fuelled PHWRs first, so that adequate plutonium is produced for effecting a rapid transition to the second stage breeder programme. However, at present the DAE is facing a serious shortage of natural uranium, even to fuel the current 18 reactors in hand. The Nuclear Power Corporation (NPCIL) is having to deliberately lower the power levels in their operating PHWRs, in order to stretch out the available fuel for a longer period. The known uranium resources in Jaduguda mines are depleting fast and the DAE is unable to start fresh mining in Domiasiat in the Northeast and Nallagunda in Andhra Pradesh due to local opposition to uranium mining. DAE may argue that the depleted uranium available from the spent-fuel reprocessing plants will supplement our limited natural uranium stocks, but in reality, there will be no substantial alleviation of the problem.

As for ensuring the continued operation of Tarapur reactors, we will need concessions from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to obtain additional fuel. All the nations which produce enriched uranium are now members of the NSG, and their current rules will not allow any such fuel sales to India. DAE’s comment that we could operate the Tarapur reactors with plutonium-based indigenous fuel is impractical and dangerous, since world-wide studies have established that introducing more than 30-35 per cent plutonium into boiling water reactors could bring about adverse changes in their safety-related physics and kinetics parameters.

The Indian fast breeder reactor experience is limited to operating a test reactor, supplied by France in the early Seventies, at about one-third its rated power level for several years. Based on this limited experience, and some very good R&D work, India is designing and building a large 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR). France and Russia are two countries which have considerable experience in building and operating commercial size fast breeder reactors, and India is well-advised to initiate detailed technical discussions and consultations with these countries on the PFBR design and our safety philosophy. DAE experts may differ with me on this, but such a step is essential to further ensure public safety. But, again, these countries can openly interact with India only if the NSG does not raise objections.

Therefore, if the seriousness of the US in providing meaningful "civilian nuclear cooperation" to India is to be tested, the Prime Minister must seek US intervention in the following three subjects. Firstly, request the US to assist India in purchasing sufficient quantities of natural uranium or yellow cake from the international market. In return, we may have to agree to place all reactors which will use that uranium under IAEA safeguards. Secondly, we must ask pointedly how the US is planning to help us meet the enriched uranium requirement for Tarapur reactors. And, thirdly, ask the US to help remove any NSG objections that may come in the way of India, Russia and France having bilateral consultations on the design, construction, operation and safety of our PFBR. Let the US demonstrate the sincerity of its offer through meeting these three genuine needs we face.

India maintains the official position that it is a nuclear weapon state, and considers the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be discriminatory. India has decided to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent and will therefore maintain an active nuclear weapons programme. As such, India cannot agree to the IAEA full scope safeguards applicable to non-nuclear weapon states. India is also unlikely to accept IAEA’s right for intrusive, short-notice inspections under its Additional Protocol.

The US wants India to eventually join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and has called for India to sign and ratify the CTBT, though it itself has not ratified it. The US has also formally exhorted the NPT member states to refrain from having any meaningful nuclear cooperation with non-NPT countries like India. The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978 (NNPA) prohibits nuclear cooperation between the US and India, and the US Congress will have to amend the NNPA if it were to happen. The US was the creator of two multinational nuclear export control groups, the NSG and the Zangger Committee, and both totally preclude any nuclear or dual-use technology cooperation with India. Finally, the US wants the acceptance of the Additional Protocol to be a condition for nuclear cooperation.

Given the above mismatch, one wonders where the MEA’s optimism stems from, unless there are discussions going on between the two official sides on certain serious quid pro quo, which only the MEA and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) are privy to. Therefore, it is high time that the government considers the preparation of a comprehensive white paper on the objectives and status of India-US nuclear cooperation and table it in Parliament, so that the interim status is known to the nation and an informed debate on the issue can take place in Parliament and outside. The MEA, the DAE and PMO would certainly benefit from such constructive debates and the feedback therefrom in their subsequent pursuit of policy.

Dr Gopalakrishnan is a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of the government of India. He can be contacted at agk37@hotmail.com